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T

he Dieppe Raid of 19 August left
an indelible mark on Canada.
As the first major offensive against
Hitler’s Festung Europa, Operation
Jubilee was a severe military setback.
Within a few hours, five thousand
Canadians (over 80 percent of the
attacking force) suffered losses
of almost 70 percent. Since that
fateful day historians have offered
various explanations of the causes
and consequences of the disaster.
For some, the lessons learned
contributed to the success of the
Normandy landings in 1944. Others
have argued Dieppe was nothing
more than a useless sacrifice. Rarely
has a military operation so polarized
opinions and intrigued researchers.
That said, virtually every study on
Dieppe focuses on the tactical and
Abstract: As historian Paul Veyne
wondered whether the ancient Greeks
believed in their myths, one may wonder
to what extent Canadians were the
dupes of propaganda during the Second
World War, particularly with regards to
the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942.
This article attempts to clarify the issue
by analyzing the way French-Canadian
newspapers “sold” the news and how
this communications strategy lead to
the opposite result to that intended.
Ironically, by focusing on the heroic
struggle of the only French-Canadian
regiment involved in the operation –
les Fusiliers Mont-Royal – and on its
casualties, the francophone press in
Quebec helped shaped the myth that
French-Canadian troops were the
principal victims of the disaster.

operational level of the raid.1 Indeed,
with the exception of the works by
Brian L. Villa and Peter Henshaw that
cover the decision-making process,
most historians have attempted to
analyze the operation’s weaknesses
rather than debate its relevance. 2
The way the planners of Jubilee
publicized the event, even though the
episode is etched into our memories,
has interested historians even less.3
It took Timothy J. Balzer’s close look
at the communication strategy of
Combined Operations Headquarters
to conclude that, overall, the story
fed to the newspapers had been
written in advance, regardless of
the raid’s outcome.4 Just as historian
Paul Veyne reflected on whether
the ancient Greeks believed in their
myth, it is worth asking to what
extent Canadians were duped by the
subterfuge. 5 Polling methods during
the war were largely experimental
and therefore unreliable which makes
examining a source as volatile as public
opinion a challenge.6 Nevertheless,
it is possible to get an idea of the
popular mood by examining indirect
sources such as newspapers. If we
agree that, in a democratic society,
the press is the mirror of tensions
and power struggles, an analysis of
this complex medium should help
us better understand the story that
was “sold” to the public and how
it was received. 7 This article will
test this hypothesis on a sample of
Quebec francophone newspapers,
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which is where the manipulation of
information reached new heights,
with sometimes astonishing results.8

To Manipulate:
a Double-Edged Sword

I

n the summer of 1942, the Canadian
press focused on the battles of
Stalingrad and El Alamein. Except
for the attacks by German submarines
in the St. Lawrence River, the
war remained a vague concept in
Canada, almost surreal, lived by
proxy essentially through the media,
newspapers and radio, or the letters
sent home by those fighting the
great crusade. It is in that context
that Canadians received news of
Résumé : Tout comme l’historien Paul
Veyne se demandait si les Grecs de
l’antiquité croyaient à leurs mythes,
on peut se demander jusqu’à quel
point les Canadiens furent dupes de la
propagande durant la Seconde Guerre
mondiale, notamment quand vint le
moment de relater le raid de Dieppe, le
19 août 1942. Cet article tente d’élucider
la question en analysant la façon
dont les journaux canadiens-français «
vendirent » la nouvelle et comment cette
stratégie de communication aboutit
au résultat inverse de celui escompté.
Ironiquement, en mettant l’accent sur le
combat héroïque de l’unique régiment
canadien-français – les Fusiliers MontRoyal – et sur les pertes francophones,
la presse francophone québécoise
contribua à façonner le mythe voulant
que les troupes canadiennes-françaises
aient été les principales victimes du
désastre.
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This iconic photo of Dieppe, taken by the Germans soon after the end of the fighting, captures the death and destruction suffered
by Canadians on the beach.

the Dieppe raid. The first press
releases confirmed the involvement
of Canadians. On the home front,
the war finally became a tangible
reality, involving soldiers with which
the population could identify. The
public relations service of Combined
Operations Headquarters attempted
to transform a military fiasco into a
victory with releases insisting that
several objectives had been achieved.
For over two months, it would present
the Canadian military debut as a
turning point in the war, a necessary
sacrifice that would pave the way to
the great invasion of Europe. From
these military releases the press
constructed a narrative that various
newspapers adapted according to
their particular perspectives.

34
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Newspaper accounts evolved
in three phases: “strategic” (19-20
August) during which a justification
of the operation was attempted;
“heroic” (21 August – 14 September),
without doubt the most paradoxical
since the casualty lists were printed
alongside articles celebrating the
“exploits” of the soldiers; finally,
“revelatory” (from 15 September)
that provided the official account of
losses and three days later the release
of an official report on the operation.
Was this sequence of coverage the
result of a specific information
strategy? Following a thorough look
of the military archives in Ottawa and
London, historian Timothy J. Balzer
answered yes to that question. His
account reveals that, even before the

raid started, Combined Operations
Headquarters had decided that the
operation would be presented as a
success, no matter its outcome.9
Because media organizations
tend to draw from similar sources,
the three-phase sequence of coverage
can be found in most Canadian
publications, and it ended with
the same level of bitterness from
coast to coast. Through the media,
the brutal test of Dieppe tended to
unify Canadians who, at least in
the course of a few weeks, came to
share a common understanding of
the raid. The bubble burst at the end
of summer, once the extent of the
disaster was revealed.
Surprisingly, the most virulent
criticisms did not come from French
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Canada, even though, as its rejection
of conscription in the plebiscite of
1942 demonstrated, it remained
hostile to any unlimited military
commitment to the war. Instead, the
most damning critiques first appeared
in the Conservative Anglo-Canadian
press. Operation Jubilee was used to
further pressure the government on
the question of overseas conscription
and attack the Liberals’ management
of the war, in particular their
determination not to antagonize
the French Canadian electorate.
In this regard, the government’s
communication strategy, which
consisted of providing information
tailored to French Canadians,
heightened tensions.10 For example,
the coverage of the raid led to a
skirmish between the Toronto Star
(Liberal), which spoke glowingly of
the French Canadians’ participation,
and the Globe and Mail (Conservative)
which took offence that French
Canadians received so much
attention. The Star subsequently
misunderstood the Globe and Mail’s
criticism, which was explained by Le
Devoir: “the Star forgot that the Globe
and Mail believes it can tarnish M.
King’s record by targeting the Star.”11
Unfortunately for the Liberal
government, the Combined
Operations Headquarters’
information strategy missed
its target. The gap between the
triumphant rhetoric and the failure
of the operation was too wide. The
Canadian high command would
later plead for the release of a more
realistic version, however Vice
Admiral Louis Mountbatten, chief
of Combined Operations, vigorously
objected, with his communication
services reasserting control over
the information released by British
newspapers.12 The British pressures
were all the more obvious when
the Canadian Army’s official
historian, C.P. Stacey, planned,
in mid-September, on publishing
the army’s first official report on
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Vice Admiral Louis Mountbatten, chief
of combined operations, was the overall
commander of the Dieppe Raid. He
attempted to control the spin of the raid
almost as soon as it was over.

the raid. Mountbatten personally
intervened to water down an honest
document. This deception discredited
the Canadian government. Even
the most moderate critics accused
the government of concealing its
responsibility for the fiasco.13
The francophone press drew from
the same sources as its Anglophone
counterparts, making use of reports
from war correspondents and
official releases, while following
the directives from the censorship
authorities.14 As a result, dissenting
points of view were expressed in
editorials and in the treatment of
the news. Nevertheless this criticism
steadily diminished. From May 1942,
censorship was reorganized and the
Department of National Defence
used the opportunity to control more
closely the dissemination of military
information in the written press
and on radio. 15 Moreover, in July
the government information service
decided to primarily use newspapers
to transmit their message. Indeed,
its new director, Charles Vinning,
felt that newspapers were more
efficient than the propaganda posters
and pamphlets already in wide
circulation. 16 This led to the idea

to release in the press portraits of
French Canadian soldiers with whom
it was assumed the francophone
public were more likely to identify.
The Dieppe operation was a golden
opportunity to promote their valour
in combat, however, because of
the outcome of the raid, the result
proved disappointing. Ironically the
communication strategy backfired
and persuaded many French
Canadians that they had largely been
sacrificed in this fatal foray. Three
examples illustrate what became a
deep-rooted myth in the collective
memory of French Canada.
In the history of the Stanislas
College, the two founders of the
institution, Jeannette and Guy
Boulizon, write that “the ill-fated
raid on Dieppe [was to] result in
over 2000 victims in several hours,
essentially French Canadians.” 17
During an interview, Jeannette
Boulizon explained that “the French
were absolutely shocked [to see] that
Quebecers were sent to the beaches
of Dieppe to get killed, while the
English [Canadians] were taking
it easy…Senior officers remained
in England…all the young French
Canadians, all of them, went to
their deaths!” 18 Also during an
interview, François-Albert Angers,
an eminent economist offered a
similar interpretation: “My reaction
was that, overall, French Canadians
had been sacrificed; experiments had
been conducted with our soldiers,
by sending them on an impossible
m i s s i o n . ” 19 A Q u e b e c h i s t o r y
textbook from the 1980s stated the
same thing: “French Canadian troops
suffered a resounding defeat. They
lost 2753 men, killed, wounded or
taken prisoner.” 20 How is it possible
that educated and well-informed
people could believe such falsehood?
Could part of the answer be found
in the media hype surrounding
Jubilee? This article seeks to test this
hypothesis by analyzing a sample
of four significant francophone
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titles, La Presse and La Patrie, two
mainstream daily newspapers of
Liberal sympathies, Le Canada, the
voice of the Liberal Party of Canada,
and Le Devoir, the voice of the French
Canadian nationalist elite.

To justify the operation:
the strategic phase

F

rom the four newspapers
emerges a common narrative,
almost mythical, featuring the only
36
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francophone unit involved, the
Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR). The
stories focused on figures like their
chaplain, Major Armand Sabourin,
and their commander, LieutenantColonel Dollard Ménard, as the
“heroes of Dieppe.” Their advocates,
the war correspondents and in
particular Ross Munro, who gave
a well-publicized presentation in
Quebec, were added to this group.
Despite the FMR’s secondary role
in the Dieppe Raid, the unit soon

became the focus of the tragedy in
Quebec.
On 19 August 1942, the raid
on Dieppe made the headlines
everywhere. The newspapers
unanimously hailed a costly, yet
necessary victory. The official story
was a virtual reproduction of the
reports released by Combined
Operations Headquarters. Within
a few days, the story of Dieppe
appeared set in stone. With the
tragedy barely over, all the key
elements, as well as the justifications –
still emphasized by many today –
grabbed the headlines. Like the
other dailies, Le Devoir included
Canadian Press releases announcing
that Canadian troops had managed
to land “on all the selected spots”
and “took the beach by storm” after
sustaining “a particularly violent
resistance on their left flank while
they landed tanks at the centre and
the right flank quickly reached its
objective.”21 In an editorial, Georges
Pelletier moderated such enthusiasm
by pointing out that the raid was
nothing more than “test” like so
many operations before. 22 As for
La Presse, it concluded that Dieppe
was a complete success, comparing
the landing to the raid against St.
Nazaire when the Germans had been
caught by surprise and sustained
“very heavy casualties.”23 Turcotte,
Le Canada’s editorialist, insisted the
raid was a precursor to a greater
invasion of continental Europe: “a
dress rehearsal for the day when
British forces throw aside Nazi
fortifications.”24
Apart from the exact toll in human
life, the sequence of events was made
public less than 24 hours after the
end of the operation. The main
justification for the raid was strategic:
Dieppe was a “dress rehearsal for the
launch of a Second Front in Europe.”25
The operation also resulted from
operational imperatives: Canadian
Military Headquarters in London
insisted on the raid’s “experimental”
nature, congratulating itself for
4
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became a part of the story. Of all the
newspapers, Le Devoir was the most
alarmed about this news. “There is
concern that Canadian losses were
heavy at Dieppe. Here, we wait for
the lists, especially as they relate to
the Fusiliers Mont-Royal,” read the
headline. Such wording suggests
that the myth of Dieppe, the idea that
French Canadians had been primarily
sacrificed during the fighting, began
to take shape as soon as the raid
was announced, at least among
nationalists. Alerted by the reports
from the war correspondents, Gérard
Pelletier feared the worst:
The news already available on Dieppe
make us anticipate long lists of dead
and wounded, as well as missing.
All the correspondents who give an
account of what happened at Dieppe
and in the vicinity point out that
the fighting was intense, the losses
considerable and, if the victorious
soldiers returned to England, many
remained in France or will be sent to
German prison camps. We should
have expected that.29

as not to attract retaliation / Heroism
of a chaplain / Nazis murder their
French Canadian prisoners and had
others stripped naked, but could
not prevent their return with their
wounded.30

La Presse saluted on its cover page
“the excellent conduct of our Fusiliers
at Dieppe…under intense enemy
fire.”31 Echoing La Presse, La Patrie
stressed the “heroism of the Fusiliers
Mont-Royal and their chaplains at
Dieppe.”32
Over the next two days,
the dispatches almost always
presented the Canadian soldiers
as “commandos,” with the effect
of magnifying their exploits.
Newspapers, including Le Devoir, did
not question this metamorphosis from
simple soldiers into super heroes.
The first headlines distinguished
clearly the “English commandos”
from the “Canadian infantry.” Such
distinctions soon disappeared from
the accounts. Instead, the editors
stopped differentiating infantry and
commandos by emphasizing that the

Other newspapers,
a l b e i t
m o r e
enthusiastically, also
implied that the FMR
did all the work, thus
helping forge the myth
of the French Canadian
sacrifice at Dieppe. In
this regard, Le Canada’s
headline captures the
sentiment:

Canadian Forces Photo ZK 28

having acquired “vital experience in
the employment of troops in large
numbers in an attack as well as an
experience in the transport of their
heavy equipment during combined
operations.” Finally, the operation
was part of a comprehensive effort
to test German defences in raids on
places such as St. Nazaire, Spitzberg
and Iceland. 26 According to the
Allies the objectives were partially
achieved through the destruction
of a battery of six guns and its
ammunition magazine, a radio
station and an anti-aircraft battery.
Combined Operations used these
small successes to justify the usage
of their communications plan written
before the raid took place. Ironically,
the same newspapers published
German communiqués that described
the operation as a “crushing defeat,”
an “enterprise planned by amateurs”
for political rather than military
gains. 27 Contradictions between
Allied and enemy information added
to the confusion and helped plant the
seeds of unease – some Allied sources
claimed 15,000 troops participated in
the raid.
In the immediate aftermath of
the raid only Gérard Pelletier of Le
Devoir guessed the participation of
the FMR and openly questioned the
fate of French Canadian soldiers:
“it is believed that among those
who participated in the raid at
Dieppe were troops belonging to
the francophone Montreal regiment
known as the “Fusiliers Mont-Royal”
as well as other French Canadian
units. We must wait for details and
the lists of wounded and missing
will allow us to better assess the
part played by our soldiers in the
raid on Dieppe.”28 It was not until
the second phase of coverage, on 21
August, that the Fusiliers Mont-Royal

The “Fusiliers Mont-Royal”
did us proud in Dieppe /
French Canadians carried
propaganda pamphlets
and posters asking the
French to remain neutral so

Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard, the commander of the Fusiliers
Mont-Royal at Dieppe, was hailed in the press as one of the heros of the
failed operation.
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Library and Archives Canada PA 179108

John Grierson (left), chairman of the
Wartime Information Board, meets
with Ralph Foster, head of graphics,
National Film Board of Canada, to
examine a series of posters produced
by the National Film Board of Canada.
One of the posters produced in the
Men of Valor series highlighted the
actions of Lieutenant-Dollard Ménard
at Dieppe. This poster can be seen in
the background between the two men.

soldiers “fell under the command of
Combined Operations.”33 The most
striking headline belonged to La
Patrie: “The commandos left Dieppe
in ruins.”34 The Fusiliers Mont-Royal
soon shared in this glory; they were
characterized as “commandos” as
soon as their participation in the
raid was announced. Canadian
Press correspondent William Stewart
maintained that they had been
“trained” as such and he also claimed
that he had accompanied them in
their training.35 A similar claim can be
traced to Le Canada: “the Fusiliers had
long been trained in the tactics used
by commandos” - and in Le Devoir
which depicted the Fusiliers “as
commandos from Quebec specially
trained…for the historic raid on

38
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Dieppe.”36 The term “commando”
disappeared from official accounts as
early as 22 August, yet it continued
to be used by newspapers. Editors
continued to use “commando” in
the captions accompanying pictures
of soldiers at Dieppe, a sign that the
term was firmly entrenched in the
vocabulary of the raid.

To “embellish” the carnage:
the Heroic Phase

D

uring the “heroic phase,” the gap
between a triumphant narrative
and the lists of victims published
daily by newspapers became more
apparent. It explains the “uneasiness”
J.L. Ralston, the minister of National
Defence, attempted to dissipate

with the release of a first official
account of Jubilee. Meanwhile,
the Army’s public relations unit
continued to feed the press with
stories from war correspondents
and testimonies celebrating FMR
soldiers. Both were heavily exploited
by Quebec newspapers, no matter
their political leaning. For example,
Le Devoir printed a Canadian Press
cable which gave the prominent role
in the raid to the French Canadian
unit: “The Fusiliers Mont-Royal and
their comrades valiantly received
their baptism of fire in combat. The
level of violence was comparable to
what their fathers had experimented
during the Great War. They saw a
number of their comrades fall under
enemy fire, others collapse covered
with wounds, and others captured
by the Germans.”37
The FMR were again portrayed
as elite soldiers: “Because of their
energy, combat skill and composure
while going through preliminary
exercises in England, those French
Canadians were chosen for the
operation against Dieppe, the first
of a series of great operations aimed
at preparing the invasion of the
European continent.” 38 A similar
point of view, written by William
Stewart, was published in La Presse.
He stressed “the excellent conduct of
our Fusiliers” in “the hell of Dieppe.”39
Le Canada was equally hagiographical
in emphasizing the central role
played by the FMR as well as their
enthusiasm for battle: “From the
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start, they were assigned to a most
difficult sector, one that required
all their courage: German weapons
fired on the landing beach, in front
of the city; the Montrealers fought
like all the others, with heroism, and
returned to their base with many
missing.”40
However, the attempts to
idealize the heroism ran headlong
into the stark reality of the casualty
figures. The constant reminders of
the Canadians’ bravery in combat
paralleled the various homages to
the fallen – burials in England,41 and
a religious service in Montreal. 42
During that period, two events, the
release of a preliminary report on
the raid43 and the conference held by
Ross Munro, offered the opportunity
to recapitulate and justify the raid,44
ten days before the official tally
of total losses was released, on 15
September. From 21 August to 4
September, official lists naming those
killed were published almost daily
by newspapers, sometimes several in
one day, in the midst of enthusiastic
articles hailing the performance of the
Canadians at Dieppe.45
This almost schizophrenic
representation of the raid was far
less favourably received in the
Anglophone press than by French
Canadian newspapers. The Ottawa
Journal lost patience: “Can we be
expected to know the truth and act
upon it if those who are leaders keep
the facts from us and try to feed us
on sugar-coated stories.”46 Two days
later, the Globe and Mail was even
more to the point: “Despite official
protestations that the raid on Dieppe
was a startling success, there is little
evidence to justify that conclusion.”47
No such criticisms can be found
in the francophone press, proud as
it was of “its” Fusiliers’ sacrifice.
Could it be because the exploits of the
famous regiment, no matter the cost
paid, offset the insults against French
Canadians for rejecting conscription?
In the aftermath of the plebiscite,
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Quebec Premier Adélard Godbout
had felt it necessary to explain in
the legislature: “yesterday’s vote
on the plebiscite, in the province of
Quebec is not the refusal to make
sacrifices for the defence of our
country. We, French Canadians,
are no less loyal than the others.”
Hailed as icons, the Fusiliers were
thus used to justify a controversial
position and promote the advantages
of voluntary service.48 In this context,
the lists of fallen soldiers sanctified
the francophone regiment and
discouraged open criticism, even
from Quebec nationalists. Le Canada
avoided altogether the question – it
only published the first casualty
list, on 22 August, and thereafter
focused on triumphant rhetoric and
promoting national unity. The other
francophone newspapers, including
Le Devoir released the casualty lists
but did not comment on the losses.
Throughout the “heroic phase,”
the newspapers differed only slightly
in approach. Le Devoir explicitly
emphasised “the names
of French Canadians
or Montrealers.”49 The
editors clearly selected
French Canadian
surnames, regardless of
where the person came
from or whether they
were officers or from
the non-commissioned
ranks. Only then
were the surnames
of Anglophones from
Montreal mentioned,
and only those of
officers. Meanwhile,
La Presse focused
more on Montrealers,
making no distinction
in language. Unlike
Le Devoir, the editor
published photos of the
casualties, including
French Canadians
of all ranks and in
no particular order,

but systematically presented the
photographs of Anglophone officers.
La Patrie followed the same approach,
even though it had a lot less space to
do so.50
Whatever the approach, the result
was the same - a disproportionate
focus on francophone victims. That
was not surprising since newspapers
targeted francophone readers. Such
over-representation helps explain
the origin of the myth surrounding
Dieppe; French Canadians were
among those who had suffered
the most. This was not necessarily
the fault of the newspapers. The
government’s own information
services, by seeking to reach
francophone audiences, may have
contributed to this distorted view.
Dependent upon official sources,
and monitored as they were by the
censorship, newspapers presented a
stereotyped story, one that was not,
in the end, very credible.
Ross Munro’s press conference
in Montreal on 5 September, ten days

39
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Three soldiers of the
Fusiliers Mont-Royal
aboard a transport
ship taking them to
England, April 1942.

before the disastrous tally of casualties
was revealed, likely strengthened the
conviction that the French Canadian
troops had suffered unduly heavy
losses. The war correspondent
traveled across Canada to discuss
Dieppe and maintain the patriotic
fervor.51 In effect, he adapted his story
to the public in Montreal, making
the Fusiliers the centre point of his
narrative. He declared:

August, 53 Munro’s
story was much
toned down. Was it
censorship? Bodies
shredded by artillery
had given way to
heroes identified
and made to seem
invulnerable. In
front of a crowd
of 8,000 people,
Munro rightly
hailed the heroism
of the Fusiliers MontRoyal’s chaplain,
Captain Armand
Sabourin, and
their commander,
Lieutenant-Colonel
Dollard Ménard.54 Munro presented
an almost superhuman portrait of the
FMR’s commander:
Colonel Ménard had taken the lead
and was ready to launch an assault
on the enemy when he got hit while
climbing over the seawall. Enemy fire
was very heavy and originated from
houses where they had taken shelter,
but also from the cliffs overlooking
the beach and the city.

The flotilla that transported the

Despite his injuries, Colonel Ménard

Fusilier Mont-Royal was positioned

remained at his post and, with the

at the centre [emphasis added] of the

help of his officers, kept directing his

expedition…on its left, traveled the

men. Mixed with the regiments from

Royal Regiment of Toronto. A little

Toronto and Hamilton, they fought

ahead, there were the flotillas carrying

with courage and nerve for hours.55

the Essex Scottish of Windsor and the
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. On
the right, other craft carried the South
Saskatchewan Regiment and the
Cameron Highlanders of Winnipeg.52

Compared to his first account,
published in the aftermath of 19
40
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Munro insisted: “nothing could
have stopped the French Canadians
– go forward was the order given
and go forward it remained.” All the
ingredients of an adventure story
were there: a brave, young French
Canadian officer who galvanized

the courage of his troops despite
overwhelming odds. Tailor-made
for the French Canadian public, the
remarks were in fact not truthful. The
correspondent presented himself as
an eyewitness to the exploits of the
French Canadian regiment while,
in fact, he had landed in Puys with
the Royal Regiment, some three
kilometres of the Fusiliers MontRoyal.56 How could he claim to have
witnessed the French Canadians in
action? In essence, Munro became a
propagandist working on behalf of
the war effort and his story mirrored
the Army’s press releases. Some
historians have since denounced such
an approach.57

Revealing the losses:
French Canadian sacrifice

O

n 15 September 1942 the
Canadian public learned what
had long been feared - more than
half the troops landed at Dieppe had
been lost: a disaster. This did not
stop La Presse from celebrating the
operation: “Canada’s total losses at
Dieppe reached 3,350 dead, wounded
and missing. It, so far, one of our
most glorious feats overseas” – even
though the compiled casualty lists
occupied two full pages.58 Le Devoir
could not help but make an ironic
comment: “Alas! There is no war
without a cost.”59
Once the official tally was known,
Canadian newspapers reacted
differently and not necessarily
according to their political affiliations.
For example, John Collingwood Read
from The Globe and Mail questioned
the relevance of the operation and
the competence of those in charge
and argued that the benefits were
not worth the cost. Other newspapers
denounced the lack of transparency
from military officials. The Liberal
Regina Leader-Post lamented the
excessive appeal to heroism at the
expense of truth.60 The other Liberal
dailies remained quiet on the issue
or accepted the official version. 61
8
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openly critical. Eustache Letellier de
Saint-Just questioned the good faith
of those who had sponsored the raid:
Now the truth is known, we do not
It is now very clear that the Canadian

believe public opinion in Canada

“commandos” accomplished their

will be satisfied with the official

mission under circumstances where

explanation that the raid on Dieppe

before the attack every detail had

was instrumental in obtaining

been considered, but the men did not

crucial information on the defensive

know that the gains would come at

organization of the enemy. If the

a heavy cost. It did not matter! They

expedition’s only goal was to survey

were given a task to complete and

coastal defences, one wonders why

they would accomplish it without

the same result could not have been

considering the risks and dangers.

achieved with a smaller deployment

They approached their task proud,

of troops.64

brave and with an admirable attitude
in the tradition of our Dominion’s
officers and soldiers during the
Great War.

Then, using the official discourse he
added: “Their sacrifice was not in
vain: it will help us prepare for the
day we can defeat the enemy and
restore peace in the world.”62
More surprising was the absence
of immediate reaction from Le Devoir.
The editorial of 15 September did not
elaborate on the official numbers.
Gérard Pelletier did not address
the issue until the following week
when Ralston presented his report.
Even then, he reiterated the Globe
and Mail’s “very sensible” question.
How could it be that an operation
that depended on the element of
surprise was continued after German
ships intercepted the Allied convoy?
Ironically Le Devoir and the Toronto
newspaper agreed on one thing: the
responsibility of defence minister
Ralston in an affair still wrapped in
questions that was “very costly, with
positive results that remained to be
determined.”63 Only La Patrie was

The concern expressed by this
column, not to mention the discretion
of the other Quebec newspapers,
had a lot to do with the conscription
crisis. For the underlying issue
remained conscription. That could
explain why in the beginning the
Liberal press emphasized the role of
French Canadians at Dieppe which
so irritated many Conservative
newspapers. Once the final cost was
known, Liberal dailies appeared
hesitant to openly criticize the
operation, for fear of giving the
debate over conscription a new
impetus. Any wasteful usage of
troops, as Dieppe proved to be,
only fueled a conservative press

eager to demand conscription. At
that stage, it was less the failure of
the raid that preoccupied Liberals
than the way it was exploited for
political reasons. To highlight the
losses put greater pressure on the
government to act. The editor of
La Patrie thought it was cause for
concern: “In the light of what we now
know about the organisation of the
Dieppe raid, it would be a profound
mistake to invoke the losses the
Canadian army sustained to stir up
the agitation over conscription.” As
for Le Soleil, its editorialist criticized
the Tory press for pushing aside the
real reasons behind the disaster and
debating instead the benefits of future
recruiting:
In short, he wrote, the failure of
these two operations [Hong Kong
and Dieppe] have been costly for
Canada, but it is certainly not the
fault of Colonel Ralston [minister
of National Defence] or [Prime
Minister] Mackenzie King…They
know full well that the political
agitators are careful not to directly
attack the federal cabinet. They
do not blame him for the poor
preparations or the sacrifice of so
much vital energy, but they insist
on finding out from the government
what measures it will take to replace
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In Quebec, the same dynamic took
place. La Presse’s editorialist took
notice of the tally but insisted that it
did not diminish the achievement:

Soldiers from the Fusiliers Mont-Royal
wade ashore from a landing craft during
a training exercise before the Dieppe
Raid, 26 February 1942.
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A German photograph of a group of Canadian soliders captured at Dieppe. It is believed
that these men are from the Fusiliers Mont-Royal based on their shoulder patches.

two regiments lost in fifteen days
[at Hong Kong] or the thousands of
men sent to their death in five hours
[at Dieppe].65

On 18 September 1942, Ralston
got the last word when he released
to the press the first official report
on Jubilee.66 It proved increasingly
difficult to hide the fact that the
strategy behind the raid, except for
a few minor successes - Varengeville
and Pourville - failed. The details
were damning, even for an
uninformed reader: the tanks were
rapidly immobilized under enemy
fire and reserve units were landed, in
particular the Fusiliers Mont-Royal,
despite the obvious traffic jam on the
beach. In spite of the use of hyperbole
such as the “magnificent support
offered by the Royal Navy,” the
report failed to convince the press of
the value of the raid.67
The first reaction came from The
Globe and Mail which wondered why
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the operation was not postponed
when the element of surprised was
lost? The newspaper attributed 67
percent of all losses to this mishap.
In Le Devoir, Georges Pelletier was
quick to chime in: “the ‘Globe and
Mail’ of Toronto (19 September) is
asking a question that makes great
sense…No doubt Mr. Ralston might
consider dispelling any confusion
over a very costly affair, as positive
results have yet to be determined.”68
From then on, to give a favourable
impetus to various Victory Bond
campaigns, the focus was to be on
the “exploitation” of Dieppe. The
minister invoked the context of the
war and remained vague on the
“lessons of Dieppe”: “the value
of the Dieppe expedition will be
explained at a later time. For now, it
is impossible to publicly analyze the
lessons of the raid without offering
information to the enemy.”69
In early October, the awards
ceremony conducted for the “heroes”

of Dieppe ended the cycle of media
coverage of Jubilee.70 As usual, Le
Devoir emphasised French Canadians,
pointing out that 27 of their soldiers
had been “decorated for bravery”
and “the FMR had the largest number
[of decorated soldiers].” Two weeks
later, a large rally held at Parc
Lafontaine in honor of the “heroes”
of Dieppe was aimed at promoting
the sale of Victory Bonds. The
announcement made all the dailies’
headlines, except for Le Devoir which
published an account the following
day on page three. 71 The grand
return of the heroes was carefully
orchestrated. Louis Saint-Laurent,
the minister of Justice, C.G. Power,
minister of National Defence for Air,
Adélard Godbout, the premier of
Quebec, and Brigadier-General Panet
presided over the event. The evening
ceremony began with a procession
and the singing of “O Canada” and
ended with “God Save the King.” The
government ordered that all radio
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stations broadcast the tribute. The
climate of distrust did not stop French
Canadians from attending the event
in great numbers and applauding
their “heroes.” According to Le
Canada, a cheering crowd of 25,000
people attended the ceremony. 72
More sober, Le Devoir confirmed that
the crowds prevented many among
the public from getting close enough
to their idols. Kept at a distance,
many had to resign themselves to
listening to the speeches through
speakers.73
The rally offered a good
opportunity to recapitulate the
stereotyped account of the raid
and launch the third Victory
Bond campaign. 74 The day of the
ceremony, interviews with Dollard
Ménard, Armand Sabourin and
other veterans were published in
La Presse. Ménard recalled the raid
in strategic terms – “Dieppe was
a necessary operation,” read the
headline, whereas Father Sabourin
praised the heroism of the Fusiliers
– “Brave men! All of them were
brave.”75 Ménard chose to stick to his
soldiers’ performance: “Dieppe was a
necessary raid where the Canadians
were successful!” He hedged his
comments, claiming that he only
wished to share his impressions and
what he had observed.76 However,
the next day, his speech clearly took
on a propagandistic tone:
Our arrangement complete, he
declared, we had time to reflect
on the night of 18 August. We
thought of France, oppressed under
German rule. We thought of women,
desperate mothers, children deprived
of food by the Nazis; we thought
of the French who had become

Vimy, Courcelette, Passchendaele
and Ypres: “We knew we could not
be less brave than those who fought
the other war.” He concluded his
speech with an overt call to support
the war effort by promoting the third
Victory Bond campaign:

and openly advocate for overseas
conscription. In truth, is this really
the role of a servant of the Church?
And, what do we gain at aggravating,
in so many ways, the emotions of our

Those over there who risk their lives
for you have the right to count on
your support at all times. Through
your hard work and your money,
you are the ones who come up
with the weapons that will give us
victory. Without those weapons, the
most admirable heroes will remain

According to Groulx, the
archbishop promised to silence
Sabourin, without much result as
it turned out, as the higher clergy
supported the Canadian government’s
war policy.79 Commentary on the raid
faded from the newspapers.

powerless. I have learned today that
the government is launching a third

Epilogue

war loan. Allow me to ask you to be
generous. Those who do not lend
their lives must donate.77

We do not know the impressions
left by Ménard’s words on the French
Canadian public, but we do know
that the words of Father Sabourin
scandalized the nationalist elite.
Unlike Ménard, Sabourin was
political. In numerous radio and
newspapers interviews the FMR
chaplain, repeatedly and bitterly
targeted the anti-conscriptionists.
“The ones who stood up were those
who stormed Dieppe” and not those
who oppose the war effort overseas,
claimed Sabourin. 78 Even though
such strong words did not appear in
Le Devoir, or any other newspaper, the
whole affair shook up the Church’s
hierarchy. In his memoirs, Lionel
Groulx recalls that, at the time,
the archdiocese of Montreal was
“bombarded” with letters and calls
of protest. In a letter to Archbishop
Charbonneau, Groulx himself
complained about the incident:

capitulation is infinitely greater than

Our people accept when the clergy

the price of victory.

reminds them of their duty in
wartime; they do not understand
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mindless attachment to colonial ties

youths?

slaves; we thought that the price of

The lieutenant-colonel did not
hesitate to reference the Great War and
the battles that had inspired his men:

policy, especially when they preach

when priests become outspoken
and provocative propagandists on
behalf of the government’s war

H

as the tragedy been forgotten
for all that? In postwar Quebec,
small reminders of the raid could be
found in the press. However, it was
not until the 1960s that the event
reappeared in the collective memory
of the province. A curious transition
from one generation to the next
appears to have taken place with the
more progressive elements adopting
the same criticisms the Conservatives
had used to frame the outcome of the
raid in the immediate aftermath. This
evolution is obvious in the newspaper
articles published following the 20th
anniversary of Dieppe.80 As much
as it was accommodating in 1942,
La Presse, consistently expressed
the painfulness of the memory.
For over thirty years, La Presse
journalist Pierre Vennat remained
the most faithful guardian of that
memory. Son of Lieutenant André
Vennat, who was killed at Dieppe,
the journalist, commemorated the
raid and remembered his father in
the columns of the daily newspaper
of the rue Saint-Jacques. Writing
on important anniversaries, Vennat
combined individual and collective
memory. Though the narrative of
his articles remained consistent from
one commemoration to another, it is
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possible to discern over the years the
growing revolt of a son against his
father’s sacrifice. This personal revolt
came to symbolize that of an entire
generation against the oppression
the previous generation had endured.
A similar attitude towards the
participation of French Canadians
can be seen in a number of media,
history textbooks and literature. In
this regard, the statement in Le petit
manuel d’histoire du Québec appears all
the more significant:
[By saying no to the 1942 plebiscite
on conscription] Quebecers refused
to wear the uniform and be sent
overseas to be used as English
cannon fodder.
That feeling was confirmed on 19
August with the Dieppe disaster.
The British Chiefs of Staff want
to find out whether the Germans
are properly defending the French
coastline. To verify the obvious,
they sent 6,100 soldiers, four-fifths
of those Canadians, to the French
coast in 253 ships. The poor fellows
fell upon a German convoy some
three miles away from the coast
and the massacre began. When
they managed to land near Dieppe,
German machine guns mowed
them down like rabbits. After two
hours [sic] of this bloody butchery,
the Chiefs of Staff understood that
the Germans defended the coastline
well. Orders were given to evacuate.
Of 4,963 Canadians, 2,752 [sic] were
killed by the Germans. The colonized
are always used as cannon fodder by
those who colonize them.81

Claiming a circulation of 125,000
copies at the end of the 1970s, this
essay confirms the evolution of
Quebec’s intellectual landscape of
that period.

Conclusion

A

newspaper analysis of the Dieppe
raid offers an impressionistic, yet
revealing image of French-Canadian
44
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public opinion. The examination
confirms the theory of Henry and
Tator that the content of the press
can be reflective of the interaction
of multiple schools of thought in a
society.82 Despite censorship of the
press, contrasting opinions which
sometimes go beyond partisan lines
are apparent. The majority of the
Liberal francophone dailies very
clearly supported the Canadian
government’s war policy, though that
did not prevent some editorialists
from severely questioning the
relevance of the raid. Le Devoir, against
all odds, demonstrated a surprising
sense of caution. Meanwhile, the
Conservative Globe and Mail used the
raid’s failure to criticize the Liberal
government. On the other hand, Le
Canada, regularly denounced those
who criticized the raid. Overall,
newspapers had little choice but to
relay the information fed to them
by the official press services. For
obvious political reasons including
the challenge of conscription, the
information shared with French
Canadians was grossly manipulated.
The only francophone unit involved
in Operation Jubilee was placed at the
heart of the raid and those in charge
of communications manufactured
heroes in order to seduce susceptible
readers. No doubt the intention
was to stimulate volunteering for
service and to erase accusations
of cowardice born out of a nearly
unanimous rejection of conscription
in the province. The attempted
manipulation of the story proved all
the more clumsy when the almost
daily releases of casualty lists were
published alongside the triumphant
discourse celebrating the “heroes of
Dieppe.” Ironically, the relentless
media coverage that focused on these
heroes appears to have backfired.
Once the full extent of the disaster
was revealed in mid-September,
French Canadians created a new
story with the FMR as the main
victims of the raid. The “Heroes
of Dieppe” that were crafted by

Combined Operations Headquarters
played a central role in creating a
potent symbol of colonial oppression
which lingered for decades in French
Canadian interpretations of the raid.
The study of the French Canadian
collective memory of the Dieppe raid
confirms a persistent resentment in
Quebec. Contrary to English Canada,
where emotions were channelled
through detailed historical analysis,
the raid did not inspire critical
studies on the francophone side.83
Instead the memory of the event
was transmitted primarily through
literature and textbooks. 84 French
Canadians never seriously debated
Operation Jubilee. Two reasons can be
surmised: the absence of institutions
able to support the growth of the
francophone military historiography
and the difficulty of identifying with
British military tradition which was
perceived as foreign. For francophone
Quebecers, the political aspects of the
raid took precedence over military
considerations. With the rise of
Quebec nationalism in the 1960s,
the event resurfaced and became
a symbol of colonial oppression.
The essence of that discourse can
be summed up in a single sentence:
Canadians, particularly French
Canadians, were sacrificed in the
name of British interests in a war
that did not concern them. The
details of the raid have faded, but
the resentment that fuelled the myth
remains strong.

Notes
1. On this subject, see the historiographical
review: Béatrice Richard, “70 ans après, le
raid de Dieppe revisité,” Revue historique
des armées 266, 2012 <http://rha.revues.
org/index7427.html> (accessed 21 July
2012).
2. Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action:
Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1994, 1989); Peter
J. Henshaw, “The Dieppe Raid: A Product
of Misplaced Canadian Nationalism?,”
Canadian Historical Review 77, no.2, (June
1996), pp.250-266.

12

: Dieppe The Making of a Myth
3. Béatrice Richard, La mémoire de Dieppe.
Radioscopie d’un mythe (Montréal, VLB
éditeur, 2002).
4. Timothy J. Balzer, Selling Disaster: How
the Canadian Public was Informed of Dieppe
(master’s thesis, University of Victoria,
2004); Timothy J. Balzer, The Information
Front: The Canadian Army, Public Relations
and War News During the Second World War
(Ph.D dissertation, University of Victoria,
2009); Timothy J. Balzer, “‘In Case the
Raid is Unsuccessful…’: Selling Dieppe
to Canadians,” Canadian Historical Review
87, no.3, (September 2006), pp.409-430.
5. Paul Veyne, Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leur
mythe? (Paris, Seuil, 1983).
6. Claude Beauregard, Edwidge Munn
and Béatrice Richard, “Portrait d’une
division,” introduction à Wilfrid Sanders,
Jack et Jacques, L’opinion publique au Canada
pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale
(Montréal, Comeau et Nadeau, 1996),
pp.9-19
7. Frances Henry and Carol Tator, Discourses
of Domination: Racial Bias in the Canadian
English Language Press (Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 2002).
8. This article offers a detailed and updated
version of these aspects which were
previously discussed in chapter 3 of
Richard, La mémoire de Dieppe.
9. Balzer, The Information Front, p.143.
10. William R. Young, “Le Canada français
et l’information publique pendant la
Seconde Guerre mondiale,” Bulletin
d’histoire politique 3/4 (printemps/été
1995), pp.227-241.
11. Le Devoir, 28 août 1942, p.1.
12. Balzer, The Information Front, p.156.
13. Ibid, pp.166-177.
14. On propaganda, see: William Robert
Young, Making The Truth Graphic: The
Canadian Government’s Home Front
Information Structure and programmes
During World War II (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of British Columbia, 1978);
On censorship, see: Claude Beauregard,
Guerre et censure, l’expérience des journaux,
des militaires et de la population pendant
la Deuxième guerre mondiale (Ph.D.
dissertation, Université Laval, Québec,
1995).
15. Young, Making The Truth Graphic, p.172.
16. Library and Archives Canada (LAC),
Mackenzie King Papers, J4 series
additional, vol.414, file 3990, n.p.,
Charles Vining, “Canadian publicity in
U.S.A. Report to the Prime Minister,”
10 July 1942, pp.2-7. Note that the
Bureau of Public Information, created
on 8 December 1939, was replaced
in September 1942 by the Wartime
Information Board, under the authority
of the prime minister.
17. This incident was reported in Le Devoir,
28 août 1942, p.1.
18. Jeannette et Guy Boulizon, Stanislas, un
journal à deux voix (Montréal, Flammarion,
1988), p.143. Interview with Jeannette
and Guy Boulizon, 6 October 1995,
Outremont.
19. Interview with François-Albert Angers,
15 September 1995, HEC, Montréal.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

20. Gérard Cachat, André Donneur, À la
recherche de mes racines (Montréal, Lidec,
1984), pp.577, 578.
21. Le Devoir, 19 août 1942, p.2, 3.
22. Georges Pelletier, Le Devoir, 19 août 1942,
p.1.
23. Manchette, “Débarquement à Dieppe/
Le tiers de ‘expédition est formée de
Canadiens/Des commandos anglais,
des fantassins canadiens, des rangers
américains, des Français, attaquent sur 60
milles des côtes,” La Presse, 19 août 1942,
p.1.
24. Le Canada, 20 août 1942, p.2.
25. Ibid.
26. Le Devoir, 20 août 1942, p.1.
27. Ibid., p.1; La Presse, 20 août 1942, p.21.
28. Gérard Pelletier, Le Devoir, 20 août 1942,
p.1.
29. Gérard Pelletier, Le Devoir, 21 août 1942.
30. Le Canada, 21 août 1942, p.1.
31. La Presse, 21 août 1942, p.1.
32. La Patrie, 21 août 1942, p.5.
33. La Presse, 19 août 1942, p.1
34. La Patrie, 20 août 1942, p.1.
35. William Stewart, “La belle conduite de
nos fusiliers,” La Presse, 21 août 1942, p.1.
36. “Les ‘Fusiliers Mont-Royal’ nous ont
fait honneur à Dieppe,” Le Canada, 21
août 1942, p.1; “L’exploit de Dieppe. Les
Fusiliers Mont-Royal ont joué un rôle de
premier plan,” Le Devoir, 21 août 1942,
p.3.
37. “L’exploit de Dieppe. Les Fusiliers MontRoyal ont joué un rôle de Premier plan,”
Le Devoir, 21 août 1942, p.3.
38. Ibid., p.3.
39. William Stewart, “La belle conduite de
nos Fusiliers,” La Presse, 21 août 1942,
p.1; William Stewart, “Les Fusiliers MontRoyal ont bravé l’enfer,” La Presse, 22 août
1942, p.11; “Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal,
héros canadiens français de l’épopée de
Dieppe,” La Presse, p.45.
40. “Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal nous ont fait
honneur à Dieppe,” Le Canada, 21 août
1942, p.1.
41. The front page has a solemn photo of
the burial of 11 Canadian soldiers killed
“glorious Dieppe commando raid”
at Brookwood Canadian Cemetery in
England. La Presse, 25 août 1942, p.1.
42. La Presse, 2 septembre 1942, pp.3, 10; La
Patrie, 2 septembre 1942, pp.3-4, Le Devoir,
2 septembre 1942, p.3.
43. La Presse, 15 septembre 1942, pp.1, 9 ;
La Patrie, 15 septembre 1942, p.3, 26 ; Le
Devoir, 15 septembre 1942, p.3
44. Coverage of the entire conference may
be found in La Presse, 5 septembre 1942,
p.53, La Patrie, pp.19-48-50; and extracts
in Le Devoir, 5 septembre, p.9.
45. Le Devoir, 24 août 1942, pp.3, 10; 25 août
1942, p.3; 26 août 1942, p.6; 27 août 1942,
p.3; 28 août 1942, p.3; 29 août 1942, p.3;
31 août 1942, p.3; 3 septembre 1942, p.4;
8 septembre 1942, p.6. La Presse, 24 août
1942, p.1; 25 août 1942, p.2; 26 août 1942,
pp.2, 25; 27 août 1942, p.2; 29 août 1942,
pp.30, 47; 31 août, p.25; 1 septembre
1942, pp.1, 9; 2 septembre 1942, p.26; 4
septembre 1942, p.2; 10 septembre 1942,
p.30. La Patrie, 21 août 1942, pp.1, 3; 23

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

55.

56.
57.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

août 1942, pp.1, 3, 46, 49; 24 août 1942,
pp.3, 26; 25 août 1942, pp.3-4, 6; 26 août
1942, pp.3, 26; 30 août 1942, pp.1, 26, 53;
4 septembre 1942, p.7. Le Canada, 22 août
1942, p.1.
Ottawa Journal, 25 August 1942, p.10, cited
in Balzer, The Information Front, p.159.
John Collingwood Read, “Dieppe’s
lessons being Studied,” Globe and Mail,
26 August 1942, p.3, cited by Timothy J.
Balzer, p.159.
La Patrie, 29 avril 1942, p.4.
Le Devoir, 25 août, p.3.
Nickname often given to La Presse.
The advertisement stated: “M. Munro
est revenu au Canada en aéroplane à la
demande de la ‘Canadian Press’ afin de
dire au peuple canadien comment ses
soldats se sont comportés lors de cette
attaque épique sur une forteresse de
l’Axe,” Le Devoir, 4 novembre 1942, p.6.
Reported in Le Devoir et La Presse du 22
août 1942.
“Vingt minutes sous un feu foudroyant,”
La Presse, 21 août 1942, p.2.
“Le raid de Dieppe/Causerie d’un
journaliste qui en fut témoin - Le rôle des
Fusiliers Mont-Royal - Résultats du raid,”
Le Devoir, 5 septembre 1942, p.9.
“Le raid de Dieppe/Causerie d’un
journaliste qui en fut témoin - Le rôle des
Fusiliers Mont-Royal - Résultats du raid,”
Le Devoir, samedi 5 septembre 1942, p.9.
The full text of Ross Munro’s conference
may be found in La Presse, 5 septembre
1942, p.39.
“Such an attitude has important
implications,” writes Claude Beauregard.
Ross Munro “was one of the few
correspondents to participate in the
Dieppe Raid (19 August 1942). His
first article on this operation gives the
impression that the raid was a success.
Yet he had to realize that it was a
monumental disaster. But censorship
was at work.” Beauregard, pp.182-183.
Similarly, Bob Bowman of Radio Canada,
also at Dieppe, reported that the raid was
a success: “Without this experience, a
second front would have been suicide.”
LAC, fonds Bushnell, MG 30, E250, vol.1,
dossier 17, Bob Bowman, “Canadians
at Dieppe, an Eyewitness Account,” 20
August 1942, cited by Beauregard, p.183.
Ibid., pp.2, 11.
Le Devoir 15 septembre 1942, p.1.
Balzer, The Information Front, p.163.
Ibid., pp.167-170.
La Presse, 16 septembre p.8.
Le Devoir, 21 septembre 1942, p.1.
“Les leçons de Dieppe,” La Patrie, 16
septembre 1942, p.10.
Cited by Léopold Richer, Le Devoir, 29
octobre 1942, p.10.
Le Devoir, 18 septembre 1942, p.3; La
Presse, 18 septembre 1942, p.17; Le Canada,
19 septembre 1942, p.3.
Le Devoir, 18 septembre 1942, p.3; La
Presse, 18 septembre 1942, p.17.
Le Devoir, 19 septembre 1942, p.1.
La Presse, 18 septembre 1942, p.18.

45

13

Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4
70. Le Devoir, 2 octobre 1942, pp.3, 6; La Presse,
2 octobre 1942, p.15; Le Canada, 3 octobre
1942, p.2.
71. La Presse, 15 octobre 1942, pp.1, 3, 19;
La Patrie, 15 octobre 1942, pp.1, 3, 26; Le
Canada, 16 octobre 1942, pp.1, 3.
72. Le Canada, 16 octobre 1942, p.14.
73. Le Devoir, 16 octobre 1942, p.3.
74. La Presse, 19 octobre 1942, p.14.
75. La Presse, 15 octobre 1942, p.1.
76. Ibid., pp.1, 19.
77. Ibid., p.15.
78. Le Canada, 26 octobre 1942, p.12.
79. Lionel Groulx, Mes mémoires, tome 4
(Fides, Montréal, 1974), pp.250-251.
80. This resurgence is particularly evident at
the unveiling of a monument to the FMR
at Dieppe on 18 August 1962. LieutenantColonel Ménard, former commander of
the regiment is at the forefront. This is
the first major official commemoration
of the raid that brought together more

46
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/4

81.
82.
83.

84.

than 400 veterans. The ceremony was also
attended by the veterans affairs ministers
of Canada and France. Le Devoir, 11 août
1962, p.2.
Léandre Bergeron, Petit manuel d’histoire
du Québec (Montréal, VLB Éditeur, 1979),
p.198.
Henry and Tator.
The francophone studies of Dieppe are
essentially the work of French (from
France) authors: René Abaudret, Dieppe:
le sacrifice des Canadiens, 19 août 1942
(Paris: Robert Laffont, 1969); Claude-Paul
Couture, Opération “Jubilee”: Dieppe, 19
août 1942” (Paris: Éditions France-Empire,
1969); Jacques Mordal, Les Canadiens à
Dieppe (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1962).
To this list may be added the translation of
the English book by Brereton Greenhous,
Dieppe, Dieppe (Montréal, Art Global, 1992).
On this topic, see: Richard, La mémoire de
Dieppe, p.99-139.

Beatrice Richard is an associate professor,
chair of the department of Humanities
and social sciences at the Royal Military
College Saint-Jean, Quebec and affiliated
to the History Department of Royal
Military College of Canada, Ontario.
She specializes in cultural studies of
warfare with a specific interest in French
Canadians’ attitude toward armed
conflicts and military institutions. She
was awarded the C.P. Stacey Prize
2004 for her book La Mémoire de Dieppe:
radioscopie d’un mythe (VLB éditeur, 2002)
and the 2011 best article prize for her
paper in The Journal of Canadian Historical
Association: “Quelle guerre raconter? Le
dilemme du légionnaire Paul Caron.”
Personal website: http://www.cmrsjrmcsj.forces.gc.ca/cp-fs/brichard/pppp-richard-eng.asp

14

